新香港六合彩开奖结果

笔耻产濒颈肠补迟颈辞苍听诲别迟补颈濒蝉

Chen, Jiahong聽and聽Burgess, Paul. 'The boundaries of legal personhood: how spontaneous intelligence can problematise differences between humans, artificial intelligence, companies and animals',聽Artificial Intelligence and Law,聽1-20, available:聽

Abstract

In this paper, we identify the way in which various forms of legal personhood can be differentiated from one another by comparing these entities with a hypothetical situation in which intelligence spontaneously evolves (i.e. without human design) within the internet: spontaneous intelligence (鈥淪I鈥�). In these terms, we consider the challenges that may arise where SI as an entity: has no owner, no designer, and no controller; has evolved into existence as a non-human created intelligence; is autonomous; has no physical form; and, although it exists around the world, exists in no particular jurisdiction. We consider issues related to the recognition of such an entity鈥檚 legal personhood. By briefly exploring the attribution of legal personality to various entities鈥攊ncluding, humans, corporations, artificial intelligence (鈥淎I鈥�) (in various forms) and higher forms of animal life鈥攚e differentiate SI whilst illustrating it shares most characteristics with human intelligence and not, as may intuitively be thought, with various forms of AI. After critically evaluating the classification of these forms of intelligence, we outline some ramifications and suggest that the approach adopted may assist in drawing more effective boundaries between the entities that are already recognised as legal persons, as well as between sub-categories of entities, such as various forms of AI.

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